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Hand-Holding, Brow-Beating, and
Shaming Into Compliance:
A
Survey
of
Comparative
Enforcement Mechanisms for Tax
Compliance
ABSTRACT

Tax authorities and policy planners have a variety of tools
at their disposal to create mechanisms to encourage and enforce
compliance with revenue collection systems. Traditionally, these
mechanisms include the possibility of criminal prosecution as
well as civil pecuniary sanctions. Despite the dominate role that
prosecution and pecuniary sanctions hold internationally,there
exists a range of alternative enforcement mechanisms utilized.
The United States has recently started to implement
nonpecuniary enforcement devices to achieve policy goals,
namely the encouragement of participating with the federal
taxing system. This Note attempts to take an initial step into
exploring the range of international enforcement mechanisms
available to policy planners. Then, it contrasts these histories
with the more recent development of taxation in the United
States. It concludes that given internationalharmonization, the
United States is more likely on the forefront ratherthan behind
the learning curve of enforcement devices. While nonpecuniary
devices may hold promise to encourage participation,further
research is needed to develop refined devices which live up to
that promise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax authorities and policy planners have a variety of tools at
their disposal to create mechanisms to encourage and enforce
compliance with revenue collection systems. Traditionally, these
mechanisms include the possibility of criminal prosecution, as well as
civil pecuniary sanctions. Despite the dominate role that prosecution
and pecuniary sanctions hold internationally, there exists a range of
alternative enforcement mechanisms. The United States has recently
started implementing nonpecuniary enforcement devices to achieve
its policy goal, namely the encouragement of participating with the
federal taxing system. This Note attempts to take an initial step into
exploring the range of international enforcement mechanisms
available to policy planners. Then, it contrasts these approaches with
the more recent development of taxation in the United States. It
concludes that, given international harmonization, the United States
is more likely on the forefront rather than behind the learning curve
of enforcement devices.
While nonpecuniary devices may hold
promise to encourage participation, further research is needed to
develop refined devices which live up to that promise.

II. DEVELOPMENT

OF THE TAx COMPLIANCE MECHANISM

It was only for the good of his subjects that he collected taxes from
them, just as the Sun draws moisture from the Earth to give it back a
thousand fold. 1
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.
If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then,
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay
2
an increased tax.

The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
3
permits, cannot be doubted.

1.
KALIDASA, RAGHUVAMSAS, RAGHUVANSAD: MAHA KA BYA VATTH (1971)
(eulogizing King Dalip, a character in the book, for wise governance). Kalidasa's work
is one of the earliest and yet most sophisticated works on political governance.
2.
IRC v. Duke of Westminster, 19 T.C. 490 (1936) (U.K.).
3.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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A. Origins of Taxation and Compliance Efforts
Tax compliance efforts are naturally derivative of their
underlying taxation systems. Definitions of tax have undergone
This is consistent with the
perceivable change over time.
developments in types of taxes, enforcement practices, and the
governing systems prevalent across the world. Two definitions from
different eras and countries summarize this change.
England, 1835: Tax is a tribute or imposition laid upon the subject,
which being certainly and orderly rated, was wont to be paid into the
4
King's exchequer.
India, 1940: Rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of
a citizen by government for the use of the nation or state; burdens or
charges imposed by the legislative power upon persons or property to
raise money for public purposes, and the enforced proportional
contribution of persons and property levied by the authority of the state
5
for the support of the government and for all public needs.

While it is a matter of popular belief that taxes on income and
wealth are a recent creation of the state, which is true enough in the
United States, there is extensive historical evidence showing that
taxes on income in one form or another were levied in primitive and
ancient communities. 6 The etymological development of the word tax
is particularly telling.
"Taxation" wends its way through the
centuries to modern English from the Middle English taxen, which
v
was derived from Middle French taxer and Mediaeval Latin taxare.
Both the Middle French and Media-val Latin stem from Latin
8
tangere: to touch, feel, rate, compute, or censure.
The selective examples below illustrate the breadth and
creativity of pre-modern taxation regimes. These early taxes were
often levied on the sale and purchase of merchandise or livestock and
were collected in a haphazard manner from time to time. 9 The
challenges faced by these early systems echo many of the same
difficulties explored today; for example, they provoke questions of

4.
SIR THOMAS E. TOMLINS, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE,
PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE BRITISH LAW: DEFINING AND INTERPRETING THE
TERMS OR WORDS OF ART: AND ALSO COMPRISING COPIOUS INFORMATION ON THE

SUBJECTS OF TRADE, AND GOVERNMENT (1st Am. ed. 1836).
5.
P. RAMANATHA AIYAR, THE LAW LEXICON WITH LEGAL MAXIMS AND WORDS
& PHRASES (2nd ed. 1996) (1940).
6.
See infra text accompanying notes 8-21. See also Thomas R. McLean, The
80-Hour Work Week: Why Safer Patient Care will Mean More Health Care is Provided
by Physician Extenders, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 339, 341-42 (2005).
7.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2345

(1993).
8.
Id.
9.
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV.
415, 458 (2003).
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ability to pay, equitable valuation, timing consideration, and
enforcement mechanisms-the subject of this Note.
Taxation systems throughout history have been challenged by
problems of compliance and enforcement. This had led to innovations
both in the nature and extent of taxation imposed and the means for
Nearly 2000 years ago, Cesar Augustus
ensuring compliance.
attempted to levy a tax on the known world.1 0 Other governmental
executives, perhaps more practically, have used more narrow forms of
taxation to help increase compliance. In the Greek, German, and
Roman Empires, taxes were levied at times on the basis of turnover
and on specific occupations."
For many centuries, particularly in Feudal Europe, revenue from
taxes went to the Monarch. 12 An excellent example of this was the
Saladin tithe.
An ecclesiastic extraction, as indicated by its
description as a tithe, the Saladin tithe was in fact a compulsory tax,
which initially was raised to fight the crusades. 13 Contemporaries
widely believed that King Henry II of England used the proceeds to
fight his own son Richard I and King Phillip II of France, rather than
retake Jerusalem. 14 The Saladin tithe was a 10% tax on revenues
and personal property. 15 Because of the nominally ecclesiastic nature
of the tax, the compulsory tithe was assessed by the dioceses and
collected by the local clergy rather than through the shires or by the
16
local sheriffs.
Even as such a broad tax with a primitive enforcement system,
the Saladin tithe was used to encourage state-favored behavior. This
policy concern resulted in relatively sophisticated exemptions,
perhaps to the chagrin of the progenitors of the modern flat-tax
movement:
This year each man shall give in alms a tenth of his revenues and
movables with the exception of the arms, horses and garments of the

10.
Id. The hubris of Augustus's attempt to tax the world may actually be
quite prescient. Eva Farkas-DiNardo, Is the Nation of Immigrants Punishing Its
Emigrants:A Critical Review of the Expatriation Rules Revised by the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 11-12 (2005) ("[T]he U.S. may be the only
country that taxes all of its citizens, including those residing in other countries, on
their worldwide income.").
See generally Cavanaugh, supra note 9, at 442-59.
11.
12.
Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative
InternationalAnalysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.
J. 461, 463 (2000).
13.
(1988).
14.

CHRISTOPHER TYERMAN, ENGLAND AND THE CRUSADES, 1095-1588, at 75-76
Id. at 191.

15.
Ordinance of the "Saladin Tithe" (1188), in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS, 1042-1189, at 420-21 (David Douglas & George Greenaway eds. 1953)
[hereinafter Saladin Tithe].
16.
Id.
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knights, and likewise with the exception of the horses, books, garments
and vestments, and all appurtenances of whatever sort used by clerks
in divine service, and the precious stones belonging to both clerks and
laymen.17

The exceptions were for state-favored investment in national
defense-i.e., arms and horses. Additionally, anyone who joined the
crusade was exempt from the tithe altogether.18 Again, the exception
was driven by the policy concern of motivating people to join the
crusade.
As with modern tax systems, the usefulness of any taxing regime
is dependent on a combination of compliance and related enforcement
mechanisms for encouraging compliance. Much like its relatively
sophisticated exceptions, the enforcement of the Saladin tithe tax was
similarly complex. The key enforcement mechanism was a blended
criminal penalty and alternative sanction, premised again on the
ecclesiastic nature of the tax: all clergy and landowners who did not
join the crusade were liable for the assessment. 19 Failure to pay
(the criminal sanction) or
would result in imprisonment
excommunication (the alternative sanction). 20 These enforcement
remedies were not mutually exclusive, and a noncompliant taxpayer
could be subject to both.21 While taxes in Mediaval England were
usually collected through the Office of the Exchequer, a separate
office with ten tellers was set up to collect the Saladin tithe in
22
Salisbury.
According to historical records, £130,000 was collected from the
tithe, which made it the largest tax ever collected in England at the
time.2 3 A similar tax was levied in France, but Philip II faced
significant difficulties in achieving compliance. 24 While the tax was
widely loathed in England, the intended purpose was recognized as
valuable. 25 In contrast, France lacked the centralized administration

Id.
17.
18.
Id. This is an early predecessor, albeit an immensely more generous one, to
modern tax breaks for military service. See, e.g., Military Family Tax Relief Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 1335 (2003). See generally Theodore Paul Manno,
Federal Income Taxation of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines, 50 S.D. L. REV. 293
(2005).
Saladin Tithe, supra note 15.
19.
TYERMAN, supra note 13, at 76-77.
20.
See id. at 76 (stating that those who failed to pay risked both
21.
excommunication and the possible outcome of a jury trial).
22.
SIDNEY KNOX MITCHELL, TAXATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 13-14 (1st ed.
1951).

Nick Barratt, The English Revenue of Richard I, 116 Eng. Hist. Rev. 635,
23.
640 (2001) (noting that while this number is subject to debate, estimates place the
collection as high as £60,000 from the English shires and £70,000 from English Jewry).
24.
Fred A. Cazel, Jr., The Tax of 1185 in Aid of the Holy Land, 30 SPECULUM
385, 385 (1955).
TYERMAN, supra note 13, at 76-77.
25.
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system of the shires and faced political opposition from both nobility
and Church sources. 26 As these were the primary enforcement
actors, their correlation with weaker compliance results renews the
charge to modern tax policy analysts to explore enforcement
mechanisms as a way of enhancing compliance.
Later, specialized taxes such as the Saladin tithe were further
expanded with the introduction of poll taxes2 7 and specialized duties
on processed goods. 28 These specialized taxes were imposed to meet
government needs for public goods, including national defense,
infrastructure, health, safety, and education. 29 The illustration of the
Saladin tithe highlights the fact that even unpopular taxes can be
effective when combined with strong enforcement mechanisms that
target various points of persuasion. Modern enforcement of tax
provisions can be achieved by identifying points of persuasion and
punishments that provide leverage for effective tax administration.
B. Enforcement of Tax Provisions:The Theories and
Problems of Implementations
Before engaging in a detailed inquiry of enforcement
mechanisms, it is important to recognize the significance of garnering
compliance. Low tax compliance can have deleterious effects to the
underlying macroeconomics of the taxing authority's government. 30
This problem is particularly acute for developing economies, which
are seeking infrastructure and expansion funds, but is a matter of
serious concern for any tax regime.

26.
Jean Dunbabin, Book Review, 103 ENG. HIST. REV. 668, 670 (1988)
(reviewing JOHN W. BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIP AUGUSTS: FOUNDATION OF
FRENCH ROYAL POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1986)).
27.
Poll Tax is a tax of a fixed amount per person and payable as a requirement
for the right to vote.
There used to be poll taxes in some places in the United States; this tax kept many
poor people from voting since they could not afford to pay the tax. The twenty-fourth
amendment to the Constitution (ratified in 1964) made poll taxes illegal. See generally,
Robert H. Talbert, Poll Tax Repeal in Texas: A Three Year Individual Performance
Evaluation, 36 J. POL. 1050, 1050 (1974) (evaluating post repeal changes in body politic
composition in Texas); Frank B. Williams, Jr., The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement
in the South, 1870-1901, 18 J. SOu. HIST. 469, 469 (1952).
28.
Tax records on finished goods such as wool, leather, and hides have been
used to extract production data. See, e.g., Carla Rahn Phillips, The Spanish Wool
Trade, 1500.1780, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 775 (1982).
29.
AIYAR, supranote 5.
30.
Robin Burgess & Nicholas Stern, Taxation and Development, 31 J. ECON.
LIT. 762, 762-63 (1993); see also Arindam Das-Gupta et al., Tax Administration
Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India, 11 INT'L. TAX & PUB. FIN. 575, 575 n.1
(2004) ("It also causes developing countries to rely excessively on regressive production
and trade taxes that generate cascading deadweight losses.").
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A robust model for regulatory approaches to encouraging
31
development has been developed in the shape of a pyramid.
Initially, a would-be regulator should attempt to persuade the general
public to pay taxes (this should be the broadest and most general
application of regulatory response and as such takes the form of the
base of the pyramid). If regulated actors do not comply with mere
gentle persuasion, the regulator should accelerate the persuasion
with individual pressure in the form of a legal notice or a warning
letter, explaining the consequences of not paying the appropriate
taxes. 32
The regulator can then continue to accelerate the
consequences to various civil penalties, and determined noncompliance would leading to criminal prosecution. 33 Sociological
research has shown that this explicit enforcement pyramid is most
34
likely to garner generalized compliance with rational regulations.
It is important to have this gradient of enforcement actions available
to the tax regulators. The ability to match the enforcement action
with the extent and determinedness of non-compliance helps to
mitigate the risk of non-enforcement by regulatory agents.3 5 The risk
of reluctance to enforce due to mismatched enforcement mechanisms
has been demonstrated in other areas of government regulation. If
the punishments for drunk driving are perceived as too severe, for
36
example, police will not uniformly enforce the drunk driving laws.
Also illustrative of this concept is an example from geopolitics: a
country may choose not to invest in becoming a nuclear power
because doing so would make it more vulnerable as the country would
have a more limited range of responses to an interstate conflict. 37
For the rational tax policy analyst, implementing a system of
enforcement mechanisms that is a responsive and effective tax
strategy requires achieving at least three objectives:

31.

JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL

MINE SAFETY 142 (1985) (discussing a response to coal mine regulation as a hierarchy,
where at the bottom, self-regulation is the norm, but gradually becoming governmentcontrolled if self-regulation fails); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE REGULATION DEBATE 35 (1992).

32.
See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 31, at 142-43 (discussing civil penalties
that could result from a coal mine operator's failure to respond to a notice of a
violation).
33.
See, e.g., id. at 143 (discussing possible criminal sanctions for a coal mine
operator's willful violation of health and safety standards).
34.
Valarie Braithwaite & John Braithwaite, An Evolving Compliance Model
for Tax Enforcement, in CRIMES OF PRIVILEGE: READINGS IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 405,

408 (Neal Shover & John Paul Wright eds., 2001).
35.
See id. at 408-09.
36.

AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 31.

37.
Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 409; see also William Epstein,
Why States Go-And Don't Go--Nuclear, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. AND SOC. SCI. 16,
20 (1977).
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1.

to ensure that the full range of credible sanctions are known to the
taxpayer,

2.

to clearly signal a willingness to cooperate initially with the
taxpayer, and
to make clear the intention to escalate in the event that
38
cooperation is not forthcoming.

3.

This graduated approach to regulation is also complicit with
administrative law theories of institutional legitimacy promoting
compliance. 39 It is argued that taxpayers are less likely to be adverse
to compliance if the institution is viewed to have acted reasonably
and morally in attempting to encourage compliance, gradually
escalating the persuasion attempts, rather than acting inconsistently
or arbitrarily. 40 A graduated enforcement system that is viewed as
procedurally fair by the regulated populace increases compliance, and
this fairness bonus is increased when the regulated populace is
41
viewed as trustworthy by a voluntary compliance mechanism.
The explicit regulatory pyramid model controls for a key
weakness of other models. 42 It strives to remove from the analysis
broad questions of motives and general attribution errors.
Notwithstanding the general removal of these "human" elements
from the analysis, it is acknowledged that motive can, inevitably will,
and even sometimes should, be implicated in determining the
43
enforcement mechanisms utilized and promulgated.
The regulated populace has been described as having a
confrontational or adversarial motivational posture towards a taxing
regime. 44
Because of this confrontational posture, creating a

38.
Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 409.
39.
ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25 (1990) (observing that high
level of legitimacy can translate into increased compliant behavior); K. Kuperan & Jon
G. Sutinen, Blue Water Crime: Deterrence,Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries,32
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 309, 312 (1998) (comparing deterrence theory with normative theory
of compliance); Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society:
Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities Into
Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 722-23 (1999)
(suggesting that public will defer to regulation if legal authorities are deemed
legitimate).
40.
See Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, ProceduralJustice and Regulatory
Compliance, 20 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 83 (1996).
41.
See id.
42.
Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 410.
43.
Id. at 410-12.
44.
Id. at 410 ("[T]he tax system is likely to be seen as oppressive and
burdensome, inflexible and unforgiving, and punishing rather than helping taxpayers.
Tax officers are likely to be construed as unhelpful, incompetent, mistrustful, and
unwilling to consult with taxpayers." [Motivational postures are described as] how we
want to and ought to engage with the regulatory system."). See generally Valerie
Braithwaite et al., Regulatory Styles, Motivational Postures and Nursing Home
Compliance, 16 LAw & POL'VY 363 (1994).

550

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:541

collaborative framework coextensive with the explicit regulatory
pyramid, which realizes the trust and perceptional fairness bonuses,
can be particularly difficult for a tax policy planner. The explicit
regulatory pyramid allows for both traditional and alternative
methods of persuasion. The model acknowledges that cooperation can
be used in conjunction with shaming norms to overcome disengaged
non-compliance. 45 This is an important consideration for policy
planners examining alternative sanctions that utilize shaming to help
create social norms of compliance and trust. Consequently, it is
recommended that a policy analyst explore the wide options available
to create a depth of enforcement mechanisms that are perceptually
fair and are able to meet the needs for acceleration. Ideally, this will
create a tax system with the perception of "power that is legitimate,
46
and that will be used against those who do the wrong thing.

III. TAX

IMPOSITION AND ENFORCEMENT IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES:
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PRACTICES

In order to create a tax system with the depth of enforcement
mechanisms that meets the explicit regulatory pyramid model, a tax
policy planner should consider various models employed throughout
the world. The following reviews the development and practices of
taxing regimes in several countries.
A. India
India is an important emerging economy, but one with a long
tradition of various governance systems. 4 7 India has a long history of
taxation and has had surprisingly complex systems for tax
enforcement mechanisms. Ancient Indian texts, including the Manu
smriti48 and Arthagdstra49 have numerous references to taxation.
The monarch was empowered to tax the populace, consistent with the

45.

Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supranote 34, at 412.

46.

Id. at 411.

47.
See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L. J. 317, 317 (2006) (discussing the importance of India and
other emerging economies to the world business environment within the realm of
Intellectual Property).
48.
THE LAWS OF MANU (Wendy Doniger trans., Dover Publications 1992)
(1886) [hereinafter MANul.
49.
ROGER BOESCHE, THE FIRST GREAT POLITIcAL REALIST: KAUTILYA AND HIS
ARTHANSHASTRA (2002).
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dictates of certain moral limitations. 50 The laws provided for direct
income taxation and accounted for deductible expenditures. 51 The
Manu smriti also recognized the political and economic risk of setting
tax rates either too high or too low. 52 Previewing the concepts
explored above with the explicit regulatory pyramid, the laws advised
establishing a tax and enforcement mechanisms that the regulated
populace viewed as trust-based. 53 The advised tax rates were:
Traders and Artisans:
Farmers and Animal Breeders:

of Net Profit to be paid in
specie.
A graduated rate of 1/6th, 1/8th,
and 1/10th to be paid in
individual
on
depending
54
circumstances.
1/5th

Additionally, the tax could be paid in some cases by rendering service
to the monarch. 55 Modern Indian tax scholars have noted that these
ancient tax systems were surprisingly effective at encouraging
56
compliance.
The other primary Indian text that is the source of
understanding ancient taxation is the Arthagdstra,a work of general
57
state governance that devotes significant time to public finance.
The author of the Artha.dastra recognized the importance of efficient
revenue and consequently devoted a significant portion of the work to
The Arthagdstra had
public finance and revenue systems. 58
extremely broad sources of taxation, including, among many others,
taxation of prostitution, gambling, liquor, traders, thief-catchers,
mining, and breeding. 59 These taxes were grouped according to

MANU, supra note 48, at 141. The limitations were under the Shastras,
50.
texts which explicate moral duties of all persons. This is an intriguing precursor to
modern constitutional limitations on taxation found in most developed economies.
Id.
51.
52.
Id.
Id. (advising against creating a tax system that overly burdened the
53.
regulated populace).
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 142.
See Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Public Finance in Ancient India,97 ANNALS AM.
56.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 151 (1978) ('%Most of the taxes of Ancient India were highly
productive.").
57.
KAUTILYA, ARTHASASTRA 253-87 (L.N. Rangarajan ed. & trans., Penguin
Books 1992) (covering one of several key passages on treasury, revenue collection, and
financial rules for civil servants).
See id. at 253-87 ("All [state] activities depend first on the Treasury.
58.
Therefor a King shall devote his best attention to it.... From wealth (kosa) comes the
power fo the Government (danda).").
59.
Id. at 260-61. For thief-catchers, see id. at 268.
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logical associations that modern business authors would describe as
"profit centers": fort taxes, country taxes, mine taxes, irrigation taxes,
forest taxes, herd taxes, and trade route taxes. 60 The tax system also
made erudite taxable duty distinctions between the type and country
of origin by applying various levies, such as the sulka and the
6
dwarabahirikadeyato foreign goods and their importers. '
This tax administration appears to have been efficient and
effective. While the taxation generally was not progressives, there
were adjustments available to deal with the needs of the state. The
Artha.4dstra provided that the exigencies of the state could merit an
unannounced increase in taxation.6 2 There was a series of tax
exemptions available to encourage public investment by private
actors.
The anugrahas and parihdras provided partial tax
exemptions, which could be extended for even five years with
complete exemption from taxation for construction of typically statedelivered services such as water-works. 63 These provisions helped
create a fair and trust-based system, consistent with a well-developed
taxing regime. The taxation was recognized as necessary for national
defense and state services, but intended to result in a loosely
equitable system in which all participants understood and accepted
their roles. 64 The Arthagdstra also emphasize rational limitations on
taxation based upon the use of and need for taxation. Like the Manu
smriti, the Arthaodstra limited taxation subject to the moral dictates
of Dharma.65 A dereliction in duty by the state could justify the
cessation of tax payments and even warrant a refund. 66 However, a
failure to pay a just tax would subject the evader to various fines and
67
criminal sanctions.
This division of tax rates, payments, and considerations
indicates sophisticated tax systems that are concomitant with the
model regulatory system. While several thousand years old, a
modern tax planner may find many unique ideas for structuring a tax
system within a rational model in the historical development of tax in
ancient India.

60.
Id. at 256-66.
61.
Id. at 262.
62.
Id. at 269-70. ("A King, who finds himself in great financial difficulty, may
collect [additional] revenue ... .
63.
Id. at 231.
64.
See MANU, supra note 48, at 185. ("Know that a king who disregards the
moral boundaries, who is an atheist and plunders the property of priests, who does not
protect (his subjects) but eats them, sinks down.").
65.
Kautilya, supra note 57, at 253. See also id. at 107 (explaining dharma as a
fundamental source of law).
66.
Id. at 90-91.
67.
Id. at 14.
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B. China
Like India, China is a key emerging economy on the
international scene. 68 Despite an ancient culture and tradition of
taxation, modern China faces the difficulties of establishing an
effective tax system.6 9 Domestic and international tax policy analysts
can look to the historical and developmental trends of China in
evaluating structural compliance mechanisms.
China is a country with a long tradition of taxation, dating at
least as early as the Xia Dynasty (2140-1711 B.C.).7 0 The current tax
system, however, emerged from various reforms instigated in the
mid-1990s. 71 This emerging tax system has been sharply criticized,
and calls for additional reform have been raised. 72 After the Chinese
Civil War and the establishment of a Maoist Communist
Government, China used a single tax system until 1980. 73 However,
as part of the process of market reform and eventual World Trade
74
Organization membership, China began to reform its tax system.
Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has
continuously used a single tax system to carry out the functions to
taxation management. 75 As late as 1980, the state maintained the
tax system and followed a pattern of unified state control over income
In 1980, however, in compliance with the
and expenditures. 76
requirements of its market integration, China began to explore ways
division of
to conduct financial and taxation reform based on the
77
income and expenditures and their respective budgets.
Generally, China has followed the advice of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other
industrialized nations by adopting a self-assessment system for
Taxpayers self-report and calculate their tax
income taxation.

68.
See Bird, supra note 47, at 333 (discussing the impact of the Chinese
economy in the form of industrial copyright piracy at $2.5 billion in 2004).
There is documentary evidence of a property tax rbgime over three
69.
thousand years old.

See JINYAN LI, TAXATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1

(1991).
A comprehensive tax system during the reign of Emperor Xia Yu was noted
70.
by historians around 100 BC. See SIMA QLAN, HISTORICAL RECORDS (Raymond Dawson
trans., 1994) (n.d.).
71.

OECD, POLICY BRIEF-ECONOMIC SURVEY OF CHINA, 2005, at 6, available

at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/25/35294862.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
Id.
See also Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, Tax Rates and Tax
72.
Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China, 112 J. POL. ECON. 471 (2004)
(exploring enforcement weakness in China's tariff r6gime).
LI, supra note 69, at 16.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 10-11.

76.
77.

Id.
Id.
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balance, whereupon the tax authority processes the self-assessment
without extensive review. 78 China has, however, begun to allocate
more resources to tax audits. 79 The sophistication of its tax system
has improved with the use of computers, enabling the identification
and flagging of basic audit risk factors. Some factors that have been
publicly acknowledged are:
1.

continuing losses for more than two consecutive years;

2.

expansion of operations despite marginal profits or losses year
after year;

3.

sudden drops in profits after the expiration of a tax holiday
period;

4.
5.

severe fluctuations in profits or losses;
lower than average margins; and

6.

significant or numerous inter-company transactions.

80

These factors are especially scrutinized in the realm of transfer
pricing and advance pricing agreements.
China is particularly
concerned about multinational corporations being able to arbitrage its
tax system and that of another nation to avoid some taxation in both
countries.8 1 To avoid this, many countries, including China, mandate
that pricing agreements include mandatory review by the competent
taxing authority.82 While other countries are more advanced in their
advance pricing arrangements and audits, China is becoming
increasingly sophisticated in auditing multinational corporations
with transfer pricing situations.8 3 Audits are being conducted
regionally, nationally, and in conjunction with overall income tax
audits.8 4 Increasing national guidance is helping to harmonize the
85
disparate quality in China's regionalized tax enforcement system.
China continues to impose serious penalties for non-compliance
with tax regulations. In order to encourage compliance, minor

78.
Clement Yuen, Supplement-China: Overview of the Current System and
the Coming Tax Reform, INT'L TAX REV. (CHINA COUNTRY GUIDE), Oct. 2003, at 9-10.
79.
Id. at 10.
80.
Id. at 10.
81.
Daniel Altman, Managing Globalization: Old Tax Breaks Fade in New
World, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 26, 2006, available at http://www.iht.comlarticles/
2006/04/25lbusiness/glob26.php.
82.
Steven Tseng et al., Navigating the APA Process in China;Advance Pricing
Arrangement, INTERNATIONAL TAX REVIEW, Dec. 1, 2006 (discussing that renewals of
pricing arrangements are not guaranteed and can be difficult to achieve).
83.
See John Sterlicchi, Transfer Trauma, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Oct. 12, 2006
(predicting that China will become more aggressive and sophisticated in transfer
pricing audits); see also China targets 15,000 foreign-owned JVs, ASIA TODAY, Apr.
2006 (discussing increasing emphasis on transfer pricing issues for Chinese tax
administrators).
84.
Yuen, supra note 78 at 10; John Lee, Transfer PricingChallenges in China,
INT'L TAX REV., Jul. 1, 2005.
85.
Lee, supra note 85.
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penalties can start at 2,000 Yuan (roughly $250), but more serious
infractions may result in pecuniary penalties up to 500% of the tax
owed. 86 Additionally, the more serious infractions may be referred for
87
criminal sanctions.
As a tax system in flux, it is difficult to extract a single-stock
Because of this inherent
picture of China's taxation system.
flexibility, however, China stands as a goldmine for observation and
experimentation with innovative compliance mechanisms.
C. Europe, Historically
From the Roman Empire to Mediwval Europe, various tax
regimes utilized a variety of methods to fund public works and
governmental expenditure in Europe. King Solomon of the Old
Testament pointed to the need for taxes to be applied for civil
purposes, and these amounts were increased during times of foreign
occupation. 88
In more sophisticated economies such as the Roman Empire, tax
farming developed, but the central powers could not practically
enforce their tax policy across a wide realm with slow communication
methods and limited regional autonomy. 8 9 The tax farmers were
obligated to raise large sums for the government but were allowed to
keep whatever else they raised. 90 Many Christians have understood
the New Testament to support the voluntary payment of taxes
through Jesus' words, "Render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's." 91
The New Testament records a variety of taxes,
indicating a fairly sophisticated taxation regime, notwithstanding the
limitations imposed by geography: a telos tax on merchandise or
94
93
travelers, 92 an annual phoros tax on property, a kensos or poll tax,
95
It is worth
and a spiritual excise tax in the form of the temple tax.

86.
Yuen, supra note 78, at 10; Amy L. Sommers & Kara L. Phillips, Assessing
the Tax Administration Law of the People's Republic of China,18 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. J. 339, 362-67 (1996).
87.
Sommers & Phillips, supra note 86, at 364.
88.
1 Kings 4:7; 9:15; 12:4.

89.

Adam Melita, Note, Much Ado About $26 Million: Implications of

Privatizing the Collection of Delinquent Federal Taxes, 16 VA. TAX REV. 699, 701-02
(1997).
90.
Id.
91.
Mark 12:17.
92.
Matthew 17:25.
93.
Luke 20:22; 23:2.
Matthew 22:17; Mark 12:14.
94.
95.
Matthew 17:24-27.
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noting that there are contrary interpretations of theology on the
subjugation to an earthly taxing authority. 96
Under the feudal system in the Middle Ages, the underpinning of
the tax system was an interlocking web of labor, duty, and obligation.
Certain systems did not explicitly tax due to the internally generated
wealth from government control of land, resources, and international
97
trade; taxation instead took the form of mandatory labor.
Tax farming, a unique enforcement mechanism, occurred
primarily in the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman empires, but also was
used at times throughout the Greater Middle East. 98 Tax farming is
the process of outsourcing the responsibility of tax collection, and at
times tax assessment, to private citizens or private, for-profit
organizations, freeing the government of the task.99 An
administrative land grant, Iqta, evolved into a system of tax farming
used by several Islamic groups. 10 0 Administrative religious leaders
would oversee the assignment of land to citizens that were key to the
societal structure, including politicians and army officers. Under a
sharecropping system, a portion of the income from the land would
compensate the Iqta holder for his civil service. 10 1 Because the
individual grant holder had a vested interest in collecting his share,

96.
For instance, Christian anarchists generally do not support taxation. See
David Deleon, The American as Anarchist: Social Criticism in the 1960s, 25 AM.
QUART. 516, 534 (1973)(discussing right-wing and left-wing, including Christian
anarchists, ability to unite on taxation resistance).
97.
Taxation in the form of labor has a long and old tradition. It was used in
the construction of the Egyptian pyramids and to create the Incan empire, where it was
called the Mita. Craig Morris and Donald E. Thompson, Huanuco Viejo: An Inca
Administrative Center, 35 AM. ANTIQUITY 344, 358 (1970).
98.
Tax Farming, http://www.spiritus-temporis.comtax-farming/.
99.
Tax farming was often a risky proposition, both for the government and the
citizens subject to it, due to agent incentive dilemmas. Consequently it only appeared
to have been efficient from an equitable view when paired with strict internal controls.
Conceptually, however, an internal control system that requires significant oversight
by the government then reduces any efficiency bonus that the government would
otherwise receive from outsourcing. The debate is currently raging in U.S. tax policy
circles as the U.S. Internal Revenue Service has begun to outsource some tax collection
efforts. See generally Stephen Barr, As IRS Scales Back Outsourcing, Union Remains
Skeptical, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 30, 2006, at D5. In fact, it has been reported
that the current system of outsourcing will cost the government more than it will
garner. See generally Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on
Finance, US. Senate, Tax Debt Collection: IRS Needs to Complete Steps to Help
Ensure Contracting Out Achieves Desired Results and Best Use of Federal Resources
(Sept. 2006), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO61065.pdf.
100.
Did-You-Mean.com,
Tax farming, http://www.did-you-mean.com/Taxfarming.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). For a full analysis of the Iqta, see generally,
BABER JOHANSEN, THE ISLAMIC LAW ON LAND TAX AND RENT: THE PEASANTS' LOSS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS AS INTERPRETED IN THE HANAFITE LITERATURE OF THE MAMLUK AND
OTTOMAN PERIOD (Croom Helm, Methuen 1988).
101.
See generally Johansen, supra note 100.
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an extensive network of dedicated tax collectors was not required,
10 2
resulting in an extremely efficient tax system.
C. United Kingdom, Modern Practice
The last hundred years have seen revolutionary development in
political science and European tax policy. The United Kingdom has a
long and stable history of income taxation. Presaging modern tax
redistribution theory, Britain passed its first progressive income tax
in 1799.103 The catastrophe of the two world wars left the United
Kingdom ravaged both in terms of human life and economic
infrastructure. These tragic circumstances, however, paved the way
to create a modern and generally efficient tax system.
The cost of war significantly impacted the United Kingdom's
taxation system. For example, the standard rate of income tax
jumped 24% over the course of World War 1.104 While increases in
personal allowances partially eased the burden for non-corporate
taxpayers, additional super-taxes represented an increasingly
complex tax system, driving by governmental need to fund its
defense. 10 5 Another example of increasing complexity was the
inclusion of Excess Profits Duty, which served the dual purpose of
revenue raiser and political act to prevent profiteering. 10 6 The two
World Wars allowed for significant experimentation in taxation. For
example, the original Excess Profits Duty evolved into an Excess
Profits Tax that raised further revenue during World War 1I.107 The
Excess Profits Tax attempted to track profits that were out of
character from pre-war levels by comparing profits to historical
peacetime amounts; any excess profits determined under this
comparison were taxed at a higher rate, initially 60% but eventually
08
reaching 100% of excess profits.'
Another development in taxation in the United Kingdom from
the war years was the "Pay As You Earn" or "PAYE" system. 0 9 The

102.
103.

Id.
Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited

Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. R. 1627, 1633, n.
13 (citing SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION & DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 53-54 (1993).
104.
HM Revenue and Customs, Taxation: World War I and a new approach,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/taxhis4.htm Oast visited Feb. 23, 2007).
105.
Id.
106.
Id.; see also, Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American
CorporateTaxation, 30 J. CORP. L. 1, 32 (2004).
107.
Hm Revenue and Customs, supranote 104.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
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PAYE system is one of systematic source-based withholding, coupled
with few deductible items.1 10 As such, only a minority of individual
taxpayers in the United Kingdom are required to actually submit a
1 11
tax return.
The United Kingdom has also been progressive in pursuing
international agreement on taxation. The first double-taxation treaty
was put in place in 1916.112 Initially much of the U.K.'s international
tax harmonization efforts were targeted within its commonwealth,
but in 1945 the United Kingdom reached its first income tax treaty
with a non-commonwealth country, the United States.11 3 The U.K.'s
extensive efforts at international tax collaboration have yielded it the
11 4
most tax agreements of any country.
Value Added Tax, commonly referred to by its acronym VAT, is a
comprehensive sales tax regime introduced in the United Kingdom in
1973.115 Generally, items are taxed at each stage of transactional
transformation." 6 Some items are exempt, where the ultimate retail
purchase is not taxed, but prior inputs are taxed. In contrast, items
designated as "zero rated" are untaxed at both the retail level and the
n7
inputs level.
Despite innovations and early policy goals of progressivity, not
all segments of the tax base received the benefit of equity
considerations. For example, married women were not independently
taxed until 1990.118 The change to individual legal recognition of
women in taxation was a long struggle, starting over a century earlier
with the Married Women's Property Act of 1882.119

The British scheme had been piloted by Churchill's Chancellor Sir Kingsley
Wood from 1940-41. On the day it was to be announced, Wood collapsed and
died. But by the end of January 1944, fifteen million people-anyone earning
£100 a year or more-had received notices telling them their code number. In
the Inland Revenue's first exercise in public relations, staff visited work places
to discuss the system with employers and employees.
Id.
110.
William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an Alternative Tax System,
23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 225-26 (2003).
111.
Id.
112.
HM Revenue & Customs, Taxation: Income tax today, http://www.hmrc.
gov.uk/history/taxhis7.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Income Tax].
113.
Id.
114.
In fact, the United Kingdom celebrated being the first country to reach 100
tax treaties with a party. John F. Avery Jones, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are
Tax TreatiesNecessary, 53 TAx L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. William J. Turner, Designing an Efficient Value Added Tax, 39 TAX L.
REV. 435, 438-42 (1984) (discussing the design of the British VAT system).
118.

Id.

119.

Id.
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In another vestige of traditionalism, the Crown was historically
exempt from income taxation. 120 While Queen Victoria briefly paid
income tax in 1842, it was not until 1992 when Queen Elizabeth
Regina II elected to pay income tax in a bid to improve public
12 1
relations vis-A-vis the British people.
D. Latin America
Made up of developing countries, most with histories of political
upheaval, Latin America presents numerous challenges to domestic
policy planners. The international community has criticized many
countries in this region for a host of tax issues, including, among
others:
1.

inefficient: a low average tax realization;

2.

overly complex: a tax structure weighted toward indirect taxes
with narrow tax bases, multiple rates, and many exemptions;

3.

institutional weakness: a limited tax administration capacity;

4.

inequitable: a mild redistributive impact; and

5.

politicized: a highly centralized tax assignment with tax
revenues transferred to sub-national governments in the form of
22
ad-hoc negotiated block grants.1

On all of these issues there have been numerous ideas for reformation
and restructuring. Perhaps the only item of consensus is the overall
need for reform. 123 Latin America has experienced pushes for tax
reform before. Notably, in the 1960s, the Organization of American
States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Economic
Commission for Latin America joined forces to conduct a series of

120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
For a broad perspective of the overall need for reform and debate thereon of
the form it should take, see generally RICHARD M. BIRD, TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1992); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA (1996); G.P. JENKINS, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
PERSPECTIVE FOR TAX POLICY REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA IN THE 1990'S (1995); G. PERRY & A.M. HERRERA, INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, PUBLIC FINANCES, STABILIZATION AND STRUCTURAL REFORM IN

LATIN AMERICA (1994); F. Rodriguez, Tax Reforms in Latin America 1978-1992: A
Comparative Analysis, 42 SOC. &

ECON. STUD.

1 (1993); Parthasarathi

Shome,

Taxation in Latin America: Structural Trends and Impact of Administration
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], Fiscal Affairs Department, Working Paper No.
99/19, 1999); Parthasarathi Shome, Recent Tax Policy Trends and Issues in Latin
America, in POLICIES FOR GROWTH: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 140 (Andr6

Lara Resende ed., 1995); Vitno Tanzi, Fiscal Policy and Economic Reconstruction in
Latin America, 20 WORLD DEV. 641 (1992).
123.
See generally Rodriguez, supra note 122.
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conferences on tax reform in Latin America. 124 These conferences,
dubbed the Joint Tax Programme, produced a draft model tax code for
Latin America and scholarship on tax administration and fiscal
policy. 125 Like current efforts, the aim was to stimulate reform and
economic growth across the region. 126 The thrust of the Joint Tax
Programme reforms were centered on general revenue direct taxation
versus earmarking and indirect taxation. 127 Because the tax systems
of Latin America were relatively unrefined at the time, the focus was
on overall architecture with the result being that functional questions
128
of administrability were given short shrift.
The need to focus on administration and enforcement became
apparent, and twentieth century reforms attempted to address these
fundamental questions. 129 Recent efforts have focused on pragmatic
concerns of neutrality, administrability, efficiency, and substantive
equity across the tax base. 130 The outgrowth of these concerns,
coupled with the warring factions over direct and indirect taxation,
131
It
have led to some uniformity across Latin American tax systems.
has been observed that the relatively homogenous tax systems of
Latin American countries generally exhibit the following common
characteristics:
1.

Implementation of broad-based and uniform VAT systems to
replace taxes on foreign trade and cascading turnover taxes.

2.

Reduction of the highest statutory tax rates and simplification of
the personal income tax system.

3.

Elimination of preferential treatment for particular sources of
corporate income and particular economic sectors.

4.

Modernization and strengthening of the institutions involved in
tax administration.

5.

Increased use of presumptive taxation on capital earnings based
on the net or gross values of assets.
Wider use of withholding taxes, current or advance payment
systems, and adjustments for inflation, tax credits and debits in

6.

124.
JOINT TAX PROGRAM OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, PROBLEMS OF TA ADMINISTRATION IN LATIN
AMERICA: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD IN BUENOS AIRES,
ARGENTINA, OCTOBER 1961 (1965); JOINT TAX PROGRAM OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, FISCAL POLICY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE
HELD IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, DECEMBER 1962 (1965).
125.
See id.

126.
Victor Lledo et al., Governance, Taxes, and Tax Reform in Latin America 18
(Inst. of Development Studies, Working Paper No. 221, 2004), available at
http://www.ids.ac.uklids/bookshop/wp/wp22L.pdf.
127.
Id.
128.

Id.

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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order to moderate the Olivera-Tanzi effect by which inflation
132
erodes the value of taxes.

These common traits heralded a policy departure away from
generally statist principals towards generally free market
philosophies. 133 It may be said that Latin American tax planners
were trying to insulate the governments' revenue systems from the
vacillations in the underlying political system. 134 Due to significant
and disruptive inflation, the tax system was seen as another fiscal
tool for governments to help mitigate the effects of inflation while
shoring up the states' treasuries. 135 Consequently, inflation concerns
spurred in no small part the adoption of withholding systems, current
136
payment systems, and inflation adjustments.
The process of tax policy reform is ongoing. 137
Long-term
macroeconomic goals, international demands from trading partners,
and requirements from foreign investors to access international
capital have impacted and limited Latin American countries ability to
explore the range of creativity for implementing tax system
changes. 13 8 While much progress has been made, the next round of
international economic contraction will likely be telling as to the
effectiveness and sustainability of individual reform measures.
E. Nonpecuniary Enforcement Mechanisms Internationally
The above has attempted to provide an initial review of several
important taxing regimes, through both historical and modern
application.
Little evidence can be found of long-term use of
nonpecuniary enforcement mechanisms.
While there is some
evidence of their historical use, there is little evidence in the
countries surveyed of comprehensive utilization. Indeed, as discussed
below, modern trends in taxation appear directed toward
collaboration and patterning off of the U.S. model of taxation.
Consequently, it is intriguing to find the United States beginning to
institute nonpecuniary enforcement mechanisms into aspects of its
taxation system.

132.
Id.
For a comprehensive discussion of the main system reform and
improvements, see generally sources cited supra note 122.
133.
Lledo et al., supra note 126, at 18-19.
134.
Id. at 19.
135.
Id.
Many Latin American countries historically have faced crippling
inflation. See John Toye, Fiscal Crisis and Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries, 24
CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECON. 21 (2000).
136.
Lledo et al., supranote 126, at 19.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
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IV. MULTINATIONAL COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS

Collaboration with other international players in the realm of
taxation is, concomitant to individual income taxation in the United
States, a fairly recent development. One of the first forays into
international tax cooperation occurred in 1998, when the Clinton
administration moved to a collaborative, rather than antagonistic,
139
position vis-A-vis the OECD harmful tax competition initiative.
The transition to cooperation from unilateral competition is thought
to be a necessary response to the increasing globalization of the
aggregate world economy. 140 These collaborative efforts are ongoing
and, while involving a balance of primarily U.S. international tax
goals and multinational free and fair trade concerns, the direction141is
moving toward integrating the U.S. and international tax regimes.

A. CollaborativeEfforts toward Tax Evasion and Enforcement
With the Bush administration, many commentators expected
less international cooperation; however, collaborative efforts have
continued despite domestic and foreign policy struggles with the new
administration. 142 The underlying policy appears consistent with the
goals pursued by previous administrations. 143
With the signing of the Williamsburg Memorandum in 2004, tax
authorities representing Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States established a joint task force to increase
collaboration and coordinate information about abusive tax
transactions. 14 4 This joint task force will assist the respective tax
administrations in addressing challenges arising from abusive tax
transactions. 145 While the tax administrations operate primarily
within their own borders, many abusive tax transactions employ
strategies that cross borders in order to make it more difficult for
domestic taxing agencies. 146 Additionally, many promoters of abusive

139.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
InternationalTaxation 28 (University of Michigan Law School, Working Papers Series,
2005).
140.
Id. at 28, 33.
See discussion infra Part IV.A. (giving an example of on-going efforts); see
141.
also Income Tax, supra note 112 (arguing that the latter age of U.S.-International tax
cooperation is towards one of integration).
142.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 139, at 28-31.
143.
Id.
144.
Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Joint International
Tax Shelter Information Centre, U.S.-Austl.-Can.-U.K., Apr. 23, 2004, Internal
Revenue
Service, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/jitsic-finalmou.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
145. Id.
146. Id.
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tax planning techniques situate their 47operations internationally and
in extradition-favorable jurisdictions. 1
Setting up a joint task force will enable the four countries to:
1.

Share expertise, best practices, and experiences in the field of
tax administration to identify and better understand abusive tax
transactions and emerging schemes, as well as those who
promote them.

2.

Exchange information about specific abusive tax transactions
and their promoters and investors within the framework of the
countries' existing bilateral tax treaties.
Carry out their individual abusive tax transaction enforcement
14 8
activities more effectively and efficiently.

3.

Officials of the tax administrations will work together in Washington,
D.C., during the initial phase of the task force's operations. 149 The
respective commissioners will review the operation of the task force
150
after twelve months.
These continuing efforts toward international cooperation will
likely push the United States and other developed nations toward
further harmonization of their respective tax regimes. There are
numerous challenges, however, which may make these first, furtive
attempts at collaboration less successful than envisioned by their
proponents.
B. The Role of Culturaland Normative Differences in
MultinationalTax Cooperation
Any multinational cooperative tax regime faces the challenges of
cultural and social differences, which come to bear in any
comparative law setting. There is currently an expansive body of
literature that seeks to quantify the effect that cultural norms have
on tax compliance. 151 There has be significant discussion in the
academic literature that attempts to quantify how values, social
norms, mores, and attitudinal studies can demonstrate change in
microeconomic decision-making by independent actors within a given
tax regime. 152 To the extent that one can demonstrate differences,

147.

Id.

148.
Canada Revenue Agency, Statement of Joint Cooperation Regarding
Abusive Tax Transactions, Mar. 15, 2004, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/nonresidents/
tax-e.pdf.
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 144.
149.
150.
Id.
See, e.g., Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture and Anthropology: On the
151.
Hopes and Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE. 119, 122 (2005)
(reviewing some of the sources of comparative social norm studies in academic
literature).
152.
Id. at 119-20.

564

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:341

these are points of concern that must be addressed in any collaborate
tax compliance mechanism. Both traditional and more contemporary
economic models have failed to effectively predict or explain these
changes. 153 While economic modeling may provide some guidance for
15 4
international collaborative efforts, its errors limit its applicability.
Traditional economic deterrence models fall flat in a cross-cultural
setting; these mathematical constructs "predict far too much
compliance and far too little tax evasion." 155 Some research indicates
that much of the concern about international tax evasion is
overblown. 156
Contrary to much of the established economic
literature, some behavioral economists have challenged the view of
the taxpayer, individual or corporate, as the amoral utility
maximizers of post-Keynesian literature. 157 This has been used to
help explain why the U.S.'s largely self-reporting tax system is among
the world's most efficient. 158
Consequently, it is important to
understand the development of enforcement mechanisms in the
United States in order to form a comparable analysis.

153.
James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the
United States and in Europe 2 (Center. for Research in Economics, Management. & the
Arts, Working Paper No. 2004-14, 2004), available at http://www.crema-research.cl
papers/2004-14.pdf.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.; see also James Alm et al., Why Do People Pay Taxes?, 48 J. PUB. ECON.
21 (1992); L.P. Feld & B.S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3
ECON. GOVERNANCE 87 (2002).
156.
Alm & Torgler, surpa note 153, at 2 (citing article in which Dr. Elffers
stated that "the gloomy picture of massive tax evasion is a phantom"). See Henk
Elffers, But Taxpayers Do Cooperate!, in COOPERATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 184-94
(Mark Van Vugt et al., eds., 2000).
157.
Id. (citing Long and Swingen's argument that "some taxpayers are
'... simply predisposed NOT to evade"' and referencing Frey and Foppa's 1986 study,
which reported that many taxpaying entities "do not even search for ways to cheat at
taxes"). See Susan B. Long and Judyth A. Swingen, The Conduct of Tax-Evasion
Experiments: Validation, Analytical Methods, and Experimental Realism, in PAUL
WEBLEY ET AL., TAX EVASION: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (1991); Bruno Frey and
Klaus Foppa, Human Behaviours:PossibilitiesExplain Action, 7 J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL.
137 (1986).
158.
Id. (explaining that Pyle harshly critiqued the post-Keynesian view of
taxpayers when he stated that "[c]asual observation suggests that not all individuals
think quite like [the amoral utility maximizer]"). "Indeed, it seems that whilst the
odds are heavily in favour of evaders getting away with it, the vast majority of
taxpayers behave honestly." Id.
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V. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS IN U.S. TAXATION

While tax evasion is a criminal offense, 159 the United States has
closely, if without acknowledgment, followed the Braithwaite model of
effective tax administration. 160 Consequently, the civil tax penalty
has been the touchstone of the U.S. tax enforcement arsenal.
A. Evolution of the Civil Tax Penalty in the United States
The United States has developed an extensive civil tax penalty
system. This system has evolved over a number a years but has been
traditional pecuniary in nature. The following survey of federal
penalty provisions in the United States demonstrates the rich history
of penalty provisions in tax policy, frequent legislative interest in
penalty provisions, and the fact that the actuating methodology for
penalty provisions has been pecuniary confiscation.
In 1939, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in its modern form
was codified by Congress. 161 This code systemized a penalty system
that had developed under the various taxation statutes that were
enacted from 1913 onward. 162 Compliance was the primary purpose
of the extensive penalty provisions Congress enacted. 163 These
penalties targeted antisocial behavior, which would undermine the
confidence in the entire taxation system. 164 For example, Congress
imposed sanctions upon taxpayers who failed to file required returns,
those who negligently failed to follow the law while reporting income
and claiming deductions, and those who fraudulently failed to report
income or fraudulently claimed deductions. 165 In 1954, Congress
recodified the IRC and readopted such penalties. 166 The Revenue Act
of 1962 enacted additional penalties for failure to file information
returns and report transfers to trusts. 167 The penalty was calculated
as the lesser of either $1,000 or 5% of the unreported amount

I.R.C. § 7201 (2000) (West 2006) (imposing a criminal penalty of up to
159.
$100,000 and five years imprisonment for willful evasion of taxes).
See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
160.
161.
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1 (1939).
162.
Id.
Id.
163.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591-736, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
166.
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
167.
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transferred. 168 Congress did, however, provide that reasonable cause
169
may serve as a defense to the penalty.
Tax penalty provisions in the United States are not limited to
income taxes. One of the best examples of this can be found in the
various penalty provisions Congress enacted in passing the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 170 Under ERISA,
Congress provided penalties for failures of employers or employee
plan administrators to comply with various provisions affecting
employee plans. A penalty of $1 per day per participant was adopted
with respect to failures to file annual registration statements. 171 This
was subject to a $5,000 annual cap, however. 172 A similar penalty of
$1 per day per participant was adopted with respect to failures to
report a change in a plan's status but with a cap of $1,000.173 A $10
per-day penalty was adopted for failures to timely file annual
information returns but with a cap of $5,000.174 A $1,000 penalty
was adopted for failures to file actuarial reports. 175 A $10 per-failure
penalty was also adopted for failures of trustees of individual
retirement accounts to report annual contributions to such
176
accounts.
Congress has added complexity to the U.S. federal civil penalty
with each major tax bill. With the passage of the Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977,177 Congress provided taxpayers with relief
from additions to tax, interest, and penalties attributable to changes
in the tax law that were made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.178
With the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1980,179 Congress adopted a special rule with respect to the estimated
tax penalty applicable to corporations whose taxable income exceeded
$1 million in any three preceding tax years.' 8 0 As is typical with
many modern penalty provisions, Congress provided a safe-harbor
exception to the penalty rule: in this case, the penalty would not be
imposed if a corporation paid estimated taxes of at least 60% of the

168.

Id. at 988.

169.
Id.
170.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (2000).
171.
I.R.C. § 6652(d)(1).
172.
Id.
173.
Id. § 6652(d)(2).
174.
Id.
175.
I.R.C. § 6692.
176.
Id. § 6693.
177.
Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat.
126 (1977).
178.
See id.
179.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599
(1980).
180.
Id. § 1111.
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current year's tax liability.' 8 1 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981182 added several new aspects to the U.S. penalty system,
including setting the interest rate for underpayments at the prime
rate, 183 increasing the penalty for failure to file an information
return, 184 increasing the penalty for withholding information, 185 and
increasing the minimum amount to qualify for the safe-harbor for
estimated tax payments to 80% of the corporation's ultimate current
year's tax liability.' 8 6 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982187 changed the interest rate on underpayments to be adjusted
at six-month intervals to the average adjusted prime rate charged by
commercial banks, 188 added a new $100 minimum penalty for failure
to file returns within sixty days of the applicable due dates, 189 and
again increased the amount of estimated taxes required to be paid by
corporations to 90% of the current year's tax liability.' 90 Also, it
provided that the Tax Court could award damages up to $25,000 to
the United States for frivolously filed petitions or maintained
proceedings.' 9 1
The Technical Corrections Act of 1982192 granted the U.S.
Treasury Secretary or his designee (i.e., the IRS Commissioner)
discretionary authority to determine whether overpayment of the
windfall profit tax could be taken into account for the purpose of
determining the application of estimated tax penalties. 19 3 When
Congress enacted the Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of
1983,194 it provided a $100 per-instance penalty for failures to timely
give required information statements to recipients of interest or
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984196 began the
dividends.' 9 5
"tax
motivated transactions," which included any
of
targeting

181.
Id. § 6655(e)(4)(B); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §
731, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
182.
Economic Recovery Tax Act § 1.
Id. § 711.
183.
Id. § 723.
184.
Id. § 721.
185.
186.
Id. § 731.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97187.
248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
I.R.C. § 6621.
188.
189.

Id. § 6651(a).

Id. § 6655.
190.
Id. § 6673(a)(1).
191.
Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1983).
192.
193.
I.R.C. § 6654.
194.
Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97
Stat. 369 (1983).
195.
Id. § 105.
196.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-369, § 1, 98 Stat. 494
(1984).
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valuation overstatement over 150% of the actual value, 197 any
activity with respect to which a loss or an investment credit is
disallowed by reason of the at-risk rules, 198 any tax straddle, 199 or use
of any accounting method specified as potentially resulting in a
substantial distortion of income. 2 0 Underpayments attributable to
any of these tax-motivated transactions would accumulate interest
set at 120% of the prevailing rate for non-tax motivated
underpayments. 2 0 1 Again, the estimated tax penalty provisions were
changed to a new, two-pronged safe-harbor: estimated payments were
to be based on 80% of the tax shown on a return or 100% of the tax
20 2
shown on the preceding year's return.
B. Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Subsequent Penalty Provisions
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act) was a seminal piece of
tax reform legislation that fundamentally overhauled the existing tax
code. 20 3 Under the 1986 Act, a number of important changes were
made by Congress, which generally provided for a more flexible, taxpayer friendly penalty system. It provided an abatement of interest
accumulation on an underpayment beginning thirty days after a
taxpayer files a waiver of restrictions on an assessment of the
underlying taxes and ending when a notice and demand is issued to
the taxpayer. 20 4 Interest on underpayments of the accumulated
earnings tax were imposed from the due date of the return for the
year that the tax is initially imposed and interest rates applicable to
underpayments were to be adjusted on a quarterly basis. 20 5 The 1986
Act also changed the basis for the interest rate to be roughly equal to
the federal short-term rate plus 300 basis percentage points and
allowed for a higher rate charged than the interest rate paid by the
government on overpayments.2 0 6 Congress also clarified that the
increased rate of interest for tax motivated transactions, as provided
for under the Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, was
applicable to transactions lacking in economic substance. 20 7 The
1986 Act also provided that the Tax Court may impose sanctions on

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. §§ 144, 155.
Id. § 144.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 411.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
See I.R.C. § 6601(c).
See id.
I.R.C. § 6621(a).
Id.
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those who file petitions in the Tax Court without exhausting their
208
administrative remedies.
With the Revenue Act of 1987 (Revenue Act), 20 9 Congress again
modified the application of the estimated tax penalty by providing a
safe harbor exception for both large and small corporations that made
estimated tax payments equal to 100% of the tax shown on a
preceding year's return.2 10 The Revenue Act also provided relief to
individuals by delaying the application of the increase in estimated
payments from 80% to 90% mandated by the 1986 Act to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1987.211
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988212
increased the penalty for having a check payable to the 2Service
13
dishonored by the financial institution upon which it is drawn.
Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,214 the
existing negligence and fraud provisions were substantively revised
and reorganized. Congress consolidated all of the penalties relating
to the obligation to file accurate tax returns into one code section and
provided for two types of fraud penalties. 2 15 The accuracy-related
penalty was systematized at a 20% penalty rate across the various
understatement provisions.2 16 Congress also provided separate fraud
penalties that are dependent upon the actions engaged in by
taxpayers; Congress provided that a new fraudulent failure to file
penalty is applicable if a taxpayer fraudulently fails to file a
return. 217 The penalty for fraudulent failure to file is 15% of the
unreported amount per month, or fraction of a month, which is
capped at a five-month period. 218 Congress also increased the fraud
penalty to 75% of the underpayments attributable to fraud. 219 The
Service has the burden of establishing fraud in the first instance, but
once it does establish an incident of fraud resulting in an
underpayment, the burden shifts to the taxpayer with respect to the
entire underpayment. 220 The 1989 Omnibus Act also changed the
penalty structures governing tax deposits, converting it to a four-level

208.
Id. § 6673(a)(1)(C).
209.
Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10000, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).
I.R.C. § 6655(d)(1)(B)(ii).
210.
Id. § 6654.
211.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102
212.
Stat. 3342 (1988).
I.R.C. § 6655.
213.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 102 Stat.
214.
2106 (1989).
215.
I.R.C. § 6662.
Id. § 6662(a).
216.
217.
218.

Id. § 6651(f).
Id.

219.
220.

Id. § 6663(a).
Id. § 6663(b).

570

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:541

system that increases the penalty the longer the taxpayer goes
without making a required deposit. 221 Responding to the growing
frustration with the "tax protestor" community, the Tax Court was
now permitted to levy a $25,000 penalty on tax protestors, an
increase from the previously allowed $5,000 of damages. 22 2 This
change in nomenclature to penalty from damages removed doubt that
the sanction could be imposed regardless of actual damages that the
223
United States may have suffered.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990224 introduced
the concept of "hot" interest; it created a punitive interest rate on
large underpayments of corporations to be equal to the applicable
federal rate plus 5%.225
With the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993,226 the defenses available against the accuracy-related penalty
changed to a stricter reasonable basis standard from the previous
"not frivolous" standard. 227 Taxpayers could only avoid a substantial
understatement penalty through disclosing the position on their
returns if the position had a reasonable basis. 228 A merely arguable
basis or a colorable claim does not meet this safe-harbor.2 29 As part
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994,230 Congress
eliminated the exception to the substantial understatement penalty
when the understatement was attributable to a tax shelter item, even
when the corporate taxpayer had substantial authority for its tax
positions.2 3 1 Consequently, if there is a substantial understatement
of corporate income tax attributable to a tax shelter item, the penalty
will apply unless the taxpayer can show "reasonable cause" for its
23 2
actions.
The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 233 extended the grace period for the
payment of taxes without interest to twenty-one calendar days if the
total tax liability was less than $100,000 and to ten business days if

221.
Id. § 6652(c)(1)(A)(ii).
222.
Id. § 6673(a)(1)(C).
223.
Id.
224.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
1388 (1990).
225.
I.R.C. § 6621(c)(1).
226.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
312 (1993).
227.
I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (GATT), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108
4809 (1994).
231.
I.R.C. § 6662.
232.
Id.
233.
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
30, 1996).

Stat.

Stat.

Stat.

(July
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the total tax liability was in excess of $100,000.234

It also gave the

Treasury Secretary the power to waive penalties associated with an
inadvertent failure to deposit employment taxes in certain
circumstances.

235

With the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,236 failure to
provide information statements to the Service and to recipients for
pension payments were included with other informational reporting
requirements and associated penalties.

237

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was the most substantial
overhaul to the tax code since the 1986 Act. 238 Among the many
changes, the 1997 act clarified the interaction between foreign tax
credit carrybacks and the penalty provisions 239 and when notices
regarding tax underpayments by corporations would trigger the hot
Further, the act extended the "reasonable cause"
interest. 240
standard to more penalties, including the penalty for failure of plan
administrators to make reports of voluntary employee contributions
to retirement savings plans, 24 1 the penalty for failures of corporations
to make prescribed reports to the Service after issuing qualified small
business stock, 242 the penalty for failures of foreign corporations to
accurately report their personal holding company tax liability, 243 and
the penalty for failures of partnerships or corporations to make
required payments after electing to have a tax year other than a
required tax year. 244

The act further expanded the net of the

substantial understatement penalty by including any partnership,
entity, plan, or arrangement that has tax avoidance as a significant
purpose, as opposed to a principal purpose standard under prior
245
statutes.
The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998246 enacted several key taxpayer protections with respect to
penalties. The act requires the Service to provide the taxpayer with
specific information about the penalty, including the method by which

234.
235.
236.

I.R.C. § 6601(e)(2)(A).
Id. § 6656(c).
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 104th

Cong., 2d Sess. (July 30, 1996).

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

I.R.C. § 6652.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
I.R.C. § 6601(d)(2).
Id. § 6621.
Id. § 6652.
Id.
Id. § 6683.

244.

Id. § 7519.

Id. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)(III).
245.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
246.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
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interest and penalties are calculated.2 47
In addition to the
calculation, the notice must state the penalty asserted, a citation to
the Code section authorizing the imposition of the calculated penalty,
and applicable interest. 248 The failure to file penalty, the failure to
pay taxes penalty, and the failure to pay estimated taxes penalty are
exempted from this revised notice requirement. 249 Also, the 1998 Act
shifted the initial burden of proof on issues involving penalties; it
became the taxpayer's burden to demonstrate that a defense existed
250
because of reasonable cause.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (2004 Act) 25 1 created
the new Section 6707A penalty of $10,000 for "natural persons" and
$50,000 for any other taxpayer for the failure to include reportable
transaction information with the proper return. 252 Additionally, the
2004 Act revised Section 6111 to require attorneys, CPAs, and other
"material advisors" who structure or advise on a reportable
transaction to file an informational return with the Service that
describes the transaction and its potential tax benefits. 253 Failure to
file the appropriate informational return subjects the advisor to a
$50,000 penalty for most reportable transactions and higher penalties
for specifically listed transactions. 254 The 2004 Act requires material
advisors to maintain documentation in their files with respect to each
reportable transaction upon which they advise, including a list of the
clients for whom they have rendered advice connected to the
reportable transaction. 25 5 Failure of a material advisor to make such
lists available to the Service within twenty business days upon the
Treasury Secretary's written request is penalized $10,000 per day,
256
without limit.
The 2004 Act provides an additional safe harbor mechanism for
the risk-averse taxpayer in the form of the new Section 6603. This
new provision allows a taxpayer to deposit funds with the Treasury to
pay any tax imposed that may be owed but has yet to be assessed

247.
I.R.C. § 6679.
248.
Id. §§ 6631, 6751, as added by Secs. 3306 and 3308 of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 105th Cong. 2d
Sess. (July 22, 1998).
249.
See I.R.C. §§ 6631, 6751.
250.
I.R.C. § 7491(c), as added by Sec. 3001 of the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (July
22, 1998).
251.
American Job Creations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004).
252.
I.R.C. § 6067A.
253.
Id. § 6111(a)(1), (2).
254.
Id. § 6111(b)(1)(B)(i).
255.
Id. § 6111(a).
256.
Id.
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when the funds are deposited. 257 This suspends the accumulation of
interest on underpayments, both under the regular interest
provisions and punitive interest provisions, as of the day the deposit
258
is made.
C. Actuating Principlesfor the U.S. Tax Penalty System
As the above history details, the pervasive penalty system has
been a patchwork of various penalty provisions. Almost without
exception, each new tax bill added additional penalties and changed
the application of preexisting penalties. In 1954, there were thirteen
penalty provisions; in 1988, that number had expanded to over 150
distinct penalties. 2 59
While some legislation has attempted to
26 0
simplify the penalty provisions (particularly, the 1989 Act
streamlined and reorganized some of the penalty provisions), the
overall trend has been the continued expansion of penalty provisions.
261
Today, there are over 600 distinct civil tax penalty provisions.
According to the Service, this complex penalty system is driven
by three actuating principles:
1.

Assisting taxpayers in understanding that compliant conduct is
right and noncompliant conduct is wrong;

2.

Deterring noncompliance by imposing costs on it; and

3.

Establishing the fairness of the tax system by justly penalizing
262
the noncompliant taxpayer.

In addition to the principles delineated by the Service, the tax
revenue effects of these various penalty provisions are not
insignificant. In 1995, the Service imposed thirty-four million
26 3
penalties, resulting in $10 billion being owed to the U.S. Treasury.
This amount represents nineteen million penalties levied on
individuals yielding $3.5 billion in penalty revenue, and ten million
penalties on business returns yielding $4.3 billion in penalty
revenue. 264 In 2003, the number of civil penalties imposed had
increased to 28.7 billion penalties levied yielding $17.8 billion in

257.
258.

Id. 6603(a).
Id.

259.
J. DWIGHT EVANS, TAX FOUNDATION, IS THE TRANSFER PRICING PENALTY
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?-A VIEW THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER'S STUDY 4 (1994).

260.
See supra text and discussion accompanying notes 214-23.
261.
Appendix 1 includes a table listing of virtually every penalty imposed by
the IRC along with a brief explanation of the provision.
262.
Penalty Policy Statement (P-1-18), Internal Rev. Manual Exhibit 20.1.1.6-1
(Aug. 20, 1998), availableat http://www.irs.gov/irmlpart20/chO1sO1.htm.
263.
IRS
1995 Annual Data Book, available at http://www.irs.gov/
taxstats/article/O,,id=97216,00.html.
264.
Id.
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revenues.2 65 The breakdown in 2003 included 19.1 billion penalties
8.4
totaling $5.15 billion in revenues from individual taxpayers2 and
66
billion penalties totaling $7.2 billion from business taxpayers.
D. Modern Nonpecuniary U.S. Tax Provisions
While clearly the principle form of enforcement for the U.S.
taxing system is the civil penalty, Congress has chosen at times to
look outside of this methodology when it would either be
undesirable.
or
otherwise
administratively,
constitutionally,
Consequently there is a body of law where, in attempt to give effect to
non-revenue policy goals, Congress has implemented nonpecuniary
enforcement devices. These nonpecuniary devices have tended to rely
on areas of federal law outside of tax to ameliorate the policy
dilemmas and perceived abuses of the IRC. Perhaps the strongest
example of this is found in the nonpecuniary attacks at perceived taxdriven behavior in the realm of expatriation.
1.

Nonpecuniary Expatriation Provisions

Expatriation is the process of losing, typically through a
conscious and purposeful act, one's citizenship. 267 The process of
expatriation is typically commenced by taking one of two steps
toward extricating oneself from the rights and obligations of
citizenship. Most commonly, an individual wishing to expatriate will
take a formal oath of renunciation before a U.S. diplomatic or
consular official outside the United States. 268 There are, however,
several specific acts one can voluntarily commit with the intent of
losing citizenship that will have the same effect as a formal
renunciation. 269 Given the pervasiveness of the U.S. tax regime and
the availability of "tax haven" jurisdictions with less onerous
obligations, there can be numerous tax benefits for those willing to
expatriate and live by the strict requirements regarding visitation
and activities in the United States.
Congress decided to implement changes to the expatriation
system in response to several high-profile, high net-worth individuals
expatriating for what were largely viewed as tax motivated

IRS 2003 Data Book, Table 27, available at http://www.irs.gov/
265.
taxstats/bustaxstats/article/,,id=136474,00.html.
Id.
266.
267.
Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
375, 381-82 (2006).
Id. at 381.
268.
Id.
269.
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concerns. 270 These examples of expatriation, while a very small
percentage of the few people who expatriate in any given year, gave
271
rise to lurid accounts of "cheating America" and calls for action.
Consequently, Congress implemented two new nonpecuniary
enforcement mechanisms to encourage compliance with federal tax
law and keep taxpayers within the U.S. tax net:
(1)

(2)

Limitations on visits to the United States were
extremely
restricted,
effectively
preventing
expatriates from reentering the U.S. if they are
deemed to be tax motivated expatriates, 272 and
A shaming mechanism that requires the names of all
who have renounced their citizenship be published in
2 73
the Federal Register.

These alternative sanctions
being too narrow to achieve
paradoxically, being overly broad
and costs of administration.2 74

have been strongly criticized as
their effectiveness goal while,
in their unintended consequences
For truly affluent, tax-motivated

270.
There has been much discussion in the press of late regarding expatriates.
See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen, Kenneth Dart Forsakes U.S. for Belize, WALL STREET J.,
Mar. 28, 1994, at Cl; Robert Lenzner & Phillipe Mao, The New Refugees, FORBES, Nov.
21, 1994, at 131; Brigid McMenamin, Flight Capital, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1994, at 55.
271.
CHARLES LEWIS & BILL ALLISON, THE CHEATING OF AMERICA: How TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION BY THE SUPER RICH ARE COSTING THE COUNTRY BILLIONSAND WHAT YOU CAN Do ABOUT IT (2001) (providing a colorful recounting of several
prominent expatriations). See also DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE
COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH-AND CHEAT
EVERYBODY ELSE (2003) (discussing the case of Kenneth Dart). Kenneth Dart, an
owner of Dart Container Corporation, which manufactures the majority of Styrofoam
cups sold in the United States, surrendered his citizenship for tax purposes and
became a citizen of Belize. Mr. Dart convinced the Belize government to appoint him
as a diplomatic representative to the United States, where he would have opened a
consular office in Sarasota, Florida, which not incidentally happened to be Mr. Dart's
former hometown and the city where his family still lived. Later, Belize withdrew its
request to appoint Mr. Dart as a consular official. Id.
272.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). This act contains the controversial "Reed
Amendment."
Id. § 352.
The Reed Amendment modified section 212 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182, which lists various
categories of aliens who are inadmissible under the immigration laws. Id. The Reed
Amendment provides that "[a]ny alien who is a former citizen of the United States who
officially renounces United States citizenship and who is determined by the Attorney
General to have renounced United States citizenship for the purpose of avoiding
taxation by the United States is inadmissible." Id.
273.
I.R.C. § 6039G(d)(3).
274.
For a thorough critique of the instrumental short-comings of the Reed
Amendment, see Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law:
Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute of Effective Tax
Policy, 89 IOWA L. R. 863, 897-906 (2004). Professor Kirsch also critiques the
publication requirement. Id. at 906-12.
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expatriates, the onus of limited or no access to the United States is
not necessarily unpalatable.2 75 The change increased the cost of
expatriating if the individual expects future visits to the United
2 76
States, but does not effectively foreclose access to the country.
The effectiveness of the publication requirement is largely
limited to those who either (1) seek out the list of expatriates or (2)
commonly peruse the federal register, both of which are likely very
short lists. The publication requirement is not likely to have any
traditional social norm consequence of differential treatment or
2 77
limited access in private ordering contexts.
2.

Other Forms of Nonpecuniary Enforcement Measures at the
Federal Level

Other forms of nonpecuniary enforcement exist, which variously
encourage compliance and participation in the U.S. tax system. The
topic of corporate inversions, whereby a company organized under the
laws of the United States changes its place of incorporation to a
foreign country, such as Bermuda, in order to reduce its future U.S.
tax liability, is another subject which has been subject to public
castigation in the popular press. 278 Congress, never content to let a
perceived slight go un-ameliorated when splayed in the national
press, enacted (as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) a ban
on these former U.S. corporations from entering into future contracts
279
with the Department of Homeland Security.
3.

State Tax Systems
Mechanisms

Use

of

Nonpecuniary

Enforcement

The use of nonpecuniary enforcement mechanisms is not limited
to the federal level. A variety of state and local governments have
sought alternative ways to encourage and enforce tax and fiscal policy
compliance.
Several states and local government revenue
departments have, for instance, created tax-shame websites which

275.
See id. (discussing the J. Paul Getty family's expatriations over time).
276.
Id. at 906.
277.
Id.
278.
See generally U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION
TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2002) (discussing generally the process of
corporate inversions, the motivations therein, and documenting several high profile
inversions).
See also Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and
Expatriations:Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT'L

TAX J. 409 (2002).
279.
See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835, 116 Stat. 2135, 2227 (2002) (codified at 6
U.S.C.A § 395 (West Supp. 2003)), amended by Homeland Security Act Amendments of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 101(2), 117 Stat. 526, 528.
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typically publish electronically the most egregious of delinquent tax
accounts.2 80 This form of "cyber-shaming" has had mixed results but
may be an important addition to the development of normative
28 1
techniques to encourage enforcement.
Also, similar to the federal government, states are using
nonpecuniary devices to encourage policy concerns outside of revenue
generation. For example, North Carolina, responding to the same
corporate inversion concerns with which the federal government is
grappling, has passed legislation prohibiting state contracts for goods
or services with corporations that have consummated a corporate
28 2
inversion.

VI. CONCLUSIONS ON NONPECUNIARY ENFORCEMENTS MECHANISMS

Given the wide range of tools that tax authorities and policy
planners have at their disposal to create mechanisms to encourage
and enforce compliance with revenue collection systems, it makes
sense to look at international systems to evaluate the effectiveness of
proposed techniques and look for new strategies that may be
implemented domestically. Traditionally in the United States, these
mechanisms have been limited to the possibility of criminal
prosecution as well as civil pecuniary sanctions. New efforts to enact
social policy goals have resulted in experimentation with
nonpecuniary enforcement devices, but these devices have been based
primarily on intuition; consequently the effectiveness of these new
nonpecuniary measures has been called into question.
Attempts to look outside of the United States for more effective
nonpecuniary enforcement devices may result in greater efficiency,
but one must take a critical eye toward international devices and
history. With the rise of multinational collaborative efforts and
harmonization, the historical trend has been away from nonpecuniary
systems and toward a harmonized tax system based roughly on the

280.
See, e.g., http://www.et.gov/drs/cwp/view.asp?a=1453&q=296114&drsNav I
(listing the Top 100 Connecticut state tax delinquents); http://www.houstontx.gov/
taxpayers.html
(listing
the
Houston
"seriously"
delinquent
taxpayers),
http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/sections/cybershame/
(listing
the
Louisiana
delinquent taxpayers); http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/mce/delinqnet /delinqnet
overview.Shtml (listing the Minnesota delinquent taxpayers); http://www.dor.state.
nc.us/collect/ delinquent.html (listing the North Carolina delinquent taxpayers);
http://dor.wa.gov/content/doingbusiness/delinquentTaxpayerList.aspx
(listing
the
Washington delinquent taxpayers),
281.
See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1453, 1493 n.218 (discussing the
normative effects of state cybershaming websites).
282.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-59.1(a)(2) (2003).
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existing U.S. model. Consequently, the United States is likely on the
cutting-edge of enforcement devices and research, rather than behind
the learning curve. Looking internationally may only provide less
refined versions of devices already in use. Additionally, because social
norms and cultural differences appear to have a strong influence on
the effectiveness of various enforcement devices, what may work for
another country may not be effective in the United States. Greater
interdisciplinary research is needed to develop more refined models to
provide answers to the question of efficient tax compliance. Legal
scholars, behavioral economists, sociologists, and anthropologists are
all exploring various sides of the question, but it appears that
currently the lack of collaboration will result in continued confusion
in the field of determining what makes a taxpayer comply and how
best to enforce compliance.
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